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Implicit Bias In The Judiciary:
Confronting The Problem Through
Normalization
Meagan Biwer*
INTRODUCTION
During a 2016 United States presidential debate,
candidates were asked to address recent murders of
unarmed black men at the hands of police. One question
focused on implicit bias, or the notion that individuals can
make subconscious judgments about others that
ultimately affect their own actions. Then-candidate
Hillary Clinton opined, “I think implicit bias is a problem
for everyone, not just police. I think too many of us in our
great country jump to conclusions about each other. All of
us need to ask hard questions about, ‘Why are we feeling
this way?’”1 In response, then-candidate Donald Trump
maintained that “[Clinton] accuses the entire country—
including all of law enforcement—of implicit bias,
essentially suggesting that everyone, including our police,
are basically racist and prejudiced. . . . [S]he has such a
low opinion of our citizens.”2
Similar dialogue has unfolded across the United
States. Modern social science reflects the existence of
implicit bias,3 but many people either have not heard of
the concept or mistakenly conflate it with overt
prejudice.4 This ignorance extends to the judiciary—the
institution that reveres Lady Justice, whose blindness

* J.D., 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2012,
Claremont McKenna College. With many thanks to Professor Charles
Geyh, whose guidance and zeal spurred my own devotion to this
issue.
1 Mark Hensch, Clinton: We Must Fight ‘Implicit Bias’, THE HILL:
BALLOT BOX (Sept. 26, 2016, 10:15 p.m.),
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297939-clinton-ithink-implicit-bias-is-a-problem-for-everyone.
2 Jenna Johnson, Two Days After the Debate: Trump Responds to
Clinton’s Comment on Implicit Bias, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://wapo.st/2dEBrrB?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.71a831e1f7f2.
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part IV.
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establishes her fairness.5 Many judges are unaware of
implicit biases and remain unwittingly subject to their
own.6 Under the current framework of judicial ethics,
judges are free to proceed without actively seeking to
understand or address their subterranean imperfections.7
To ensure that the judiciary performs its duties without
bias, we must remove the stigma associated with implicit
biases to allow for—and require—judges to address them.
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will
review societal expectations and statutory requirements
for objectivity in the judiciary. Part II will provide an
overview of implicit bias—what it is, how it affects
behavior, and how it can be measured. Part III will then
assess the levels of implicit bias found in judges, followed
by Part IV, which will review existing proposals aiming to
curb the effects of those biases. Finally, Part V will
present a novel solution that takes a fundamentally
different approach to confronting the potential
consequences of judges’ implicit biases.
I. OBJECTIVITY IN THE JUDICIARY: WHY IT MATTERS
Justice Cardozo once said that a judge can simply
“disengage himself . . . of every influence that is personal
or that comes from the particular situation which is
presented to him, and base his judicial decisions on
elements of an objective nature.”8 In this classic model of
judicial neutrality, a judge can embody objectivity and
impartiality so long as he or she consciously sets aside
any personal biases.9 Judges themselves are proponents
of this theory. Most—if not all—judges believe that they
decide cases fairly, objectively, and in a way that
harmonizes the facts and legal issues at hand.10
5

Id.
Id.
7 See infra Part III.
8 Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the
Invention of Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of
Judicial Neutrality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 573, 617 (2011) (quoting
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 121
(1920)).
9 Id. at 617–18.
10 Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the
Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693, 695 (2014).
6
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Impartiality and objectivity are valued not only in
practice, but also in appearance. The appearance of
neutrality is just as important as actual neutrality in that
the former establishes judicial legitimacy in the eyes of
the public.11 “The modern sensitivity to the importance of
appearances represents . . . an acknowledgment of the
importance now generally accorded to attempts to explain
the relationship between government and the governed in
terms of a commitment of respect for the value of
individual human dignity and equality.”12 In other words,
“an appearance standard . . . better ensures procedural
justice.”13 Procedural justice stems from the notion that
the way an adjudicator handles a dispute affects the
overall outcome for a party.14 Because a party’s trust in
the system undergirds procedural justice, an unbiased
result may not be ultimately just if the party perceives
impropriety.
It makes sense, then, that these norms have been
codified. Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
focuses on impartiality. Rule 2.2 requires all judges to
“perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.”15 Rule 2.3 addresses bias, stating, “[a] judge
shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.”16 A
comment to the same rule suggests that “[a] judge who
manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the
fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into
disrepute.”17 And the United States Code requires that
any justice or judge “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party . . . .”18 The purpose of these
provisions is clear: they serve to protect the legitimacy of
the judiciary and safeguard procedural justice for citizens.
But what if one’s biases aren’t easy to detect or eradicate?
See generally Oakes & Davies, supra note 8.
Id. at 623–24.
13 Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91
N.C. L. REV. 1951, 1991 (2013).
14 Id. at 1983.
15 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
16 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
17 Id. at cmt. 1.
18 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
11
12
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II. DEFINING AND MEASURING IMPLICIT BIAS
A. What is Implicit Bias?
Known as “implicit biases,” these hidden biases
involve “stereotypical associations so subtle that people
who hold them might not even be aware of them.”19 Not
only do they exist, but they are quite prevalent; most
people harbor implicit biases—including individuals who
consciously seek to embrace equality.20
Implicit biases stem from the mental schemas all
humans develop in learning to process the complexity of
the world.21 Heuristics—mental shortcuts used by default
in subconscious decision-making—have long been held to
operate in the minds of all people.22 These subconscious
algorithms developed through evolution to allow the
human mind to more efficiently process stimuli.23 In other
words, “to simplify the complex flood of information from
the world, we tend to categorize objects, people, and
occurrences into groups, types, or categories . . . so that
we can treat non-identical stimuli as if they were
equivalent.”24 Because our beliefs are heavily influenced
by culture, and yet our neural development is not, many
heuristics that may once have proved useful actually
misfire today.25 Our latent biases become “the price we
pay for such efficiency.”26

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich &
Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).
20 Id. at 1197.
21 Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST.
TODAY, Summer 2009, at 16, 17,
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/ImplicitBias.pdf.
22 See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion:
Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, 41 ADVOC. Q. 49,
56 (2013).
23 See id. at 57.
24 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 707.
25 Jones, supra note 22, at 57.
26 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 710.
19
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B. Measuring Implicit Bias: The Implicit
Association Test
Because implicit biases are inherently latent,
measuring them seems far from straightforward. Despite
this difficulty, researchers at Harvard’s Project Implicit
developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has
become the gold standard for measuring implicit bias.27
The IAT measures the strength of subconscious
associations by comparing the amount of time an
individual takes to make them.28 Consider being asked to
read two lists: one, comprised of a list of colors, each
written in its namesake ink (for example, “blue” written
in blue ink); the second, listing colors written in randomly
colored inks (for example, “red” written in yellow ink). If
you suspect that the first list might take less time for
most people to read than the second, you are right—
because individuals subconsciously associate colors with
their names, being asked to perform a task incongruous
with those associations takes more time.29 This latency is
the exact gauge by which the IAT measures implicit bias.
How does the IAT actually work? The “Race IAT,”
which tests for implicit biases toward people of color,
provides an explicit example of the IAT’s controlled
performance. Rachlinski describes the process as follows:
First, researchers present participants with a
computer screen that has the words “White or
Good” in the upper left-hand corner of the
screen and “Black or Bad” in the upper right. . .
.[O]ne of four types of stimuli will appear in the
center of the screen: white people’s faces, black
people’s faces, good (positive) words, or bad
(negative) words. . . . [P]articipants [are
instructed to] press a designated key on the left
side of the computer when a white face or a good
word appears and press a designated key on the
right side of the computer when a black face or
a bad word appears. . . . Then, the computer is
Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1198.
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 953 (2006).
29 See J. Ridley Stroop, Studies of Interference in Serial Verbal
Reactions, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 643, 659–60 (1935).
27
28
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programmed to switch the spacial location of
“good” and “bad” so that the words “White or
Bad” appear in the upper left-hand corner and
“Black or Good” appear in the upper right.
[Participants then repeat the same process
with the new opposite pairings.]30
Ultimately, researchers have found that many
Americans show a strong “white preference” on this test,
as their response time is much faster in the first task
(associating “white” with “good” and “black” with “bad”)
than in the second (associating “white” with “bad” and
“black” with “good”).31 Approximately seventy-five percent
of all individuals who have taken the IAT through Project
Implicit’s website have demonstrated white preference.32
This phenomenon is not limited to white individuals;
Project Implicit reports that its research consistently
shows that half of black individuals who have taken the
Race IAT have also demonstrated a white preference (the
remainder vary between showing no preference and black
preference).33 While someone taking the test may believe
that they harbor no biases toward people of color, their
response times may indicate otherwise.
C. The Effects of Implicit Bias
While the acquisition of implicit biases is normal,
implicit biases can be “more dangerous and pernicious
than . . . bigotry because [they are] ephemeral and
difficult to eradicate.”34 Individuals inevitably (if
unwittingly) act on these biases. While implicit biases
implicate a wide variety of traits, journalist Nicholas
Kristof describes the phenomena best when discussing
implicit racial bias:

Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1198–99.
Id. at 1199.
32 MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT:
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 47 (2013).
33 Project Implicit, FAQs,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq1
8 (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
34 L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the
Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 892 (2017).
30
31
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[R]acial stereotyping remains ubiquitous, and
. . . the challenge is not a small number of
twisted white supremacists but something
infinitely more subtle and complex: People who
believe in equality but who act in ways that
perpetuate bias and inequality.35
The harmful effects of these biases can be
compounded by peripheral circumstances. When
circumstances appear ambiguous, an implicit bias might
be magnified. 36 The same is true if an individual lacks the
time or the cognitive capacity to think deeply in a given
moment. 37 For example, whites have demonstrated more
activation in the region of the brain associated with fear
when they see black faces;38 this innate bias in white
individuals can be recognized on its face for the
potentially serious consequences it could wreak on
innocent black individuals.
So how do these biases ultimately manifest
themselves? For their seemingly sterile origins in
neurology, they can have widespread tangible effects. In
healthcare, physicians’ implicit biases against black
patients have resulted in fewer recommendations for
treatment of black patients than for similarly-situated
white patients;39 the same holds true for overweight
patients.40 In a study on employment decision-making,
hiring managers demonstrated implicit racial bias, even

Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Is Everyone a Little Bit Racist?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2kavMcg.
36 Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial
Realism in Antidiscrimination Law, 94 OR. L. REV. 359, 375 (2016).
37 Id.
38 Gregory S. Parks & Andre M. Davis, Confronting Implicit Bias: An
Imperative for Judges in Capital Prosecutions, 42 HUM. RTS. 22, 22
(2016).
39 Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H.
Ngo, Kristel L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231, 1235 (2007).
40 Gina Kolata, Why Do Obese Patients Get Worse Care? Many Doctors
Don’t See Past the Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2d2e7Bt.
35
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when the same individuals purported to value equality.41
In policing, more force has been used by officers arresting
black children than when arresting white children.42 If
these insidious effects can permeate other professions
that demand integrity, how susceptible is the judiciary?
III. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY
Despite the norms and expectations set forth in
Part I, judges may not have the capacity to be fully
objective.43 In 1947, John P. Frank—a former law clerk to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black—noted that “‘a
more recent humility has prompted the recognition’ of the
possibility that ‘human judges’ may succumb to ‘less
tangible prejudices’ and thereby deny justice.”44
A. Recent Research & Outcomes
Misfiring heuristics can exert marginal influence
over legal outcomes, but they have the capacity to fully
subvert mental calculations. As a result, these misfiring
heuristics can cause judges to render fully irrational
decisions.45 Recent studies have demonstrated that
seemingly irrelevant factors have statistically had
significant effects on legal outcomes. For example, judges
who had recently contemplated their own deaths were
more likely to make conservative decisions; appellate
judges who were temporally further from their last meal
were more likely to affirm; and judges in general were
more likely to side on behalf of the party who argued

See generally Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring:
Real World Evidence, (Inst. for the Study of Lab. Discussion Paper
No. 2764, 2007); see also John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner,
Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 315, 318 (2000).
42 Girvan, supra note 36, at 374 (citing Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew
Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison Lewis Di Leone, Carmen Marie
Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence:
Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 539–40 (2014)).
43 See generally Jones, supra note 22.
44 Oakes & Davies, supra note 8, at 616–17 (quoting John P. Frank,
Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605, 618–19 (1947)).
45 Jones, supra note 22, at 53.
41
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first.46 Something as insignificant as an attorney’s dress
can also play a role in judicial decision-making.47
These irrational correlations are not limited to seemingly
innocuous factors; studies have shown disparities in legal
outcomes based on a defendant’s race alone. In one study,
researchers found that judges set bail at amounts twentyfive percent higher and sentences at lengths twelve
percent longer for black defendants than for similarly
situated white defendants.48 In another study,
researchers studied 522 motions for summary judgment
decided by 431 federal district court judges and found that
there was roughly a fifty percent difference between white
and minority judges who decided employment civil rights
claims involving white plaintiffs.49 A third study
demonstrated that, in cases involving white victims, a
black defendant with strong Afrocentric features was
twice as likely to receive the death sentence than a
defendant with weak Afrocentric features.50 A final study
demonstrated that the composition of panels in Voting
Rights Act cases can affect the cases’ outcomes, as panels
with at least one black judge were notably more likely to
vote for liability than panels without any black judges
(even when controlling for political predispositions).51 Do
these studies demonstrate judicial susceptibility to
implicit biases, or are other factors at play?

Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
48 Ian Ayers & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination
in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 992 (1994); see also David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300
(2001).
49 Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 313, 344 (2012).
50 Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns,
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006). See generally William T.
Pizzi, Irene V. Blair & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing
on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005).
51 Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1493, 1536 (2008).
46
47
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B. Judges and the IAT
Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski and his colleagues
conducted the first study examining 133 judges from
three different regions of the United States for implicit
bias.52 The judges’ IAT results demonstrated that judges
harbor implicit racial biases at rates consistent with the
rest of the population.53 Later, when the same judges
were given hypothetical scenarios and asked to render a
decision regarding the theoretical defendant’s crime, the
judges’ implicit biases manifested themselves. After being
primed to assume (but not specifically told) the
defendant’s race, judges primed to perceive the defendant
as black imposed harsher punishments than those judges
who had not been primed regarding the defendant’s
race.54 This study was followed by another, conducted by
Professor Justin Levinson, that demonstrated similar
judicial bias against Jews and individuals of Asian
descent.55
While these implicit biases may seem predictable
from a sociological perspective, they fly in the face of the
judicial identity, and judges can be blindsided by their
IAT results. An unnamed federal district court judge
reflected, “I was eager to take the test. I knew I would
‘pass’ with flying colors. I didn’t. . . . I ultimately realized
that the problem of implicit bias is a little recognized and
even less addressed flaw in our legal system.”56
Rachlinksi does not recommend using the IAT as a
“measure of qualification to serve on the bench,”
especially since judges can overcome implicit bias to a
certain extent.57 After all, should all judges be removed
for harboring implicit biases, “there might be no one left
to judge.”58 But given the fact that judges both harbor and
See generally Rachlinksi et al., supra note 19.
Id. at 1221.
54 Id. at 1223.
55 Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging
Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69
FLA. L. REV. 63, 104 (2017).
56 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 149, 150 (2010).
57 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1228.
58 Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to
Cry “Bias!”, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 184 (2015).
52
53
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act on these biases, what can be done to combat their
effects?
IV. CURRENT SUGGESTIONS & POTENTIAL CAVEATS
Given the prevalence of implicit bias among judges,
many researchers have begun to propose approaches to
eradicating them. This Part of the Note will explore some
of those suggestions and their potential caveats.
A. Education
As the aforementioned federal district judge noted,
implicit bias is a problem that has yet to be fully
recognized.59 To this end, most researchers begin by
suggesting that a first step in eliminating the effects of
implicit bias involves recognizing that the problem
exists.60 Judge Mark Bennett, who sits on the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, noted
that, in his work training judges on implicit bias, “only a
tiny percentage—far less than [one percent]—have been
aware of racial implicit bias and IAT scores[.]”61 This
ignorance in itself not only keeps the problem from being
addressed, but it can actually perpetuate the issue. In
fact, the concept of colorblindness—the belief that race
has effectively become a non-factor in the lives of
Americans—can actually generate greater expressions of
bias on both explicit and implicit levels.62
How should one raise awareness, then? Several
researchers advocate for widespread IAT testing to raise
awareness, followed by targeted training to equip judges
with the ability to mitigate their own biases.63
The caveats of this approach are not without merit.
For starters, most people—including judges—believe that
they exceed the norm in their ability to control their own

Bennett, supra note 56, at 150.
Jones, supra note 22, at 114; Richardson, supra note 28, at 887.
61 Mark W. Bennett, The Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing: The Next
Frontier, 126 YALE L. J. F. 391, 404 (2017).
62 Richardson, supra note 34, at 888.
63 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1228; Richardson, supra note 34,
at 888.
59
60
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biases.64 This inclination illuminates another heuristic
known as egocentric bias.65 In the words of Judge
Bennett, “Judges, like all vertebrates, have visual blind
spots . . . . We also have cognitive blind spot bias—that is,
the ability to see bias in others, but not in ourselves.”66
The judges in Rachlinski’s study were asked to rate their
ability to be objective and “avoid racial prejudice in
decisionmaking” relative to the other participating
judges.67 Ninety-seven percent of the judges rated
themselves in the top half.68 Judge Bennett conducted his
own study, and, like Rachlinski, found that “92% of senior
federal district judges, 87% of non-senior federal district
judges, [and] 72% of magistrate judges . . . ranked
themselves in the top 25% of respective colleagues in their
ability to make decisions free from racial bias.”69 Judges,
even when equipped with knowledge of and training on
implicit biases, could remain overconfident in their own
objectivity and thus struggle to combat the issue.
In addition to egocentric bias, trouble lies in the
fact that the judges believe themselves to be objective.
Studies have shown that “when a person believes himself
to be objective, such belief licenses him to act on his
biases.”70 One study involved a group tasked with
providing performance evaluations based on candidate
profiles.71 When faced with two candidates with identical
qualifications, but of opposite genders, a control group
provided statistically similar evaluations for both
candidates.72 But the experimental group, which had been
primed to believe in its own objectivity, evaluated the
64

Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1225–26.
Jones, supra note 22, at 72.
66 Bennett, supra note 61, at 397.
67 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1225–26.
68 Id.
69 Bennett, supra note 61, at 397.
70 Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald,
Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012).
71 Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s
True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination,
104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210–
11 (2007).
72 Id.
65
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male candidate higher than the female candidate.73 Belief
in one’s own objectivity can actually subvert it, especially
given the rates of egocentric bias discussed in Bennett’s
and Rachlinski’s studies. These findings demonstrate
that, while education may serve as a valuable tool to
combat implicit bias, education alone will likely not
suffice.
B. Rational Deliberation & Taking the Time
Another set of proposed solutions capitalizes on the
fact that “rational deliberation” with others can mitigate
the effects of implicit biases.74 Any quick-thinking
decision shrouded by bias can be identified when a judge
spends time discussing his or her reasoning; a biased
decision can then be avoided after the judge or panel of
judges realizes that it might not be the most rational
outcome. For Professor Craig Jones, this approach takes
the form of a heavier judicial reliance on bench
memoranda and conferences with court attorneys.75 For
Rachlinski, such rational deliberation entails the
reinstatement of three-judge panels where possible.76 And
Professor L. Song Richardson sees a solution merely in
judges consciously taking the time and exercising the
diligence that each defendant deserves.77
While these solutions could conceivably succeed if
put into practice, their impracticalities might outweigh
their potential benefits. Judicial groupthink might
minimize the potential benefit of intracourt collaboration;
as a class of individuals that remains largely homogenous,
judges may remain ill-equipped to fully “appreciate their
decisions from the perspectives of diverse litigants.”78
Rachlinski also admits that three-judge panels have
largely been abandoned in jurisdictions across the country
because they drive up court costs and are perceived as
Id.
Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2huFHbl.
75 Jones, supra note 22, at 119–20.
76 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1231.
77 Richardson, supra note 34, at 889.
78 Mitchel F. Crusto, Empathetic Dialogue: From Formalism to Value
Principles, 65 SMU L. REV. 845, 859 (2012).
73
74
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inefficient (why put three heads on a case when one will
do?).79 But the biggest caveat that spans each iteration
above is the fact that “[j]udges, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers in many criminal courtrooms across the country
are laboring under the weight of far too many cases to
give each one individualized treatments.”80 As a result,
“professionals struggle to quickly sort defendants into
those who are deserving of time and attention and those
who are not,” which results in the manifestation of
implicit biases.81 While rational deliberation could clearly
combat the manifestation of implicit biases, it remains
unclear that it can serve as a standalone solution, given
its impracticality.
C. Diversifying the Bench & Judicial Perspective
Yet other proposals entail diversifying both the
bench and judicial perspective. Professor Rebecca Lee has
proposed that “[a] bench consisting of judges with diverse
characteristics and from diverse life paths will better
relate to a wider range of litigants.”82 And while judicial
diversity initiatives have emerged,83 their beneficial value
for the specific purpose of combating implicit bias remains
to be seen. Rachlinski’s study demonstrated that
“[e]xposure to a group of esteemed black colleagues
apparently is not enough to counteract the societal
influences that lead to implicit biases.”84
Similarly, Professor Negowetti suggests empathy,
or “an ‘imaginative experiencing of the situation of
another,’” as a tool judges can employ to consciously
combat the effects of their own implicit biases.85 Yet this
perspective-taking might fall prey to the same issues as
Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1231.
Richardson, supra note 34, at 875.
81 Id.
82 Rebecca K. Lee, Judging Judges: Empathy as the Litmus Test for
Impartiality, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 176 (2013).
83 See generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Monique Chase & Emma
Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Improving_Ju
dicial_Diversity_2010.pdf.
84 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1227.
85 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 725–29 (citing Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1581 (1987)); see also
Richardson, supra note 28, at 884.
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both implicit bias training and deliberate rationalization:
judges can be overconfident in their own ability to identify
biases, and they may not have the time or mental space to
thoroughly vet each situation.
D. The Overarching Caveat: Defensiveness
While the above solutions represent noble attempts
to combat the effects of implicit biases, they are not
without their own shortfalls. They also share an
additional, particularly damaging caveat: the potential for
defensiveness on the part of the implicitly biased.
The exchange between Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump featured in this Note’s introduction illustrates the
confusion that exists around implicit bias. Sociological
research is well-established that implicit biases exist
across the board,86 but societal norms have yet to embrace
the “normalcy” of the concept. As a result, mere
suggestion that one might harbor implicit biases can
serve as the worst kind of character assassination. In
such situations, people “protest what they see as a
character smear.”87 Vice President Mike Pence, in
responding to allegations that police officers’ implicit
biases may lead to more shootings of black individuals,
suggested that such “accusations” actually “demean law
enforcement.”88 Writer David French asserted that one
can “indict entire communities as bigoted” by invoking the
concept of implicit biases.89 And when Judge Shira
Scheindlin held the stop-and-frisk policy of the New York
Police Department to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory, her “findings must have stung, not simply
because she ruled against the City, but because she found
that the conduct of the police and the City were
influenced by unconscious racial bias.”90
Judges are particularly susceptible to
defensiveness, as the suggestion of implicit bias is
synonymous with questioning one’s ability to do one’s job.
One case exemplifies this pattern. After a recent case
See supra Part II.
Yudkin & Bavel, supra note 74.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Green, supra note 58, at 189 (emphasis in original).
86
87
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involving a white police officer who shot and killed an
unarmed black man, the officer was found not guilty of
murder despite what critics felt to be overwhelming
evidence of guilt.91 In the written opinion for the case, St.
Louis Circuit Judge Timothy Wilson wrote, “The Court
observes, based on its nearly 30 years on the bench, that
an urban heroin dealer not in possession of a firearm
would be an anomaly.”92 Yet when faced with questions
about implicit bias, Judge Wilson’s colleagues were quick
to defend his “objectivity.” “He’s very methodical and a
very objective judge,” said Jack Garvey, a lawyer and
former St. Louis Circuit Judge, “I don’t think he’s
ideological.”93 Similarly, St. Louis defense attorney Joel
Schwartz reflected, “My feeling on Judge Wilson is he’s a
man who will do the right thing.”94 Implicit in these
reactions is the stigma associated with harboring an
implicit bias.
Current sociological research reflects society’s
tendency toward defensiveness when faced with implicit
bias feedback; indeed, defensiveness may be an
individual’s first reaction.95 In one recent study,
participants took the Race IAT and were asked for their
reactions upon seeing their results.96 Roughly two-thirds
of the participants who displayed a bias on the IAT
attributed their outcomes to factors unrelated to their
own mental associations.97 The study showed that the
See Shibani Mahtani, St. Louis Protests Follow After Officer Found
Not Guilty of 2011 Killing of Black Man, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2017,
3:36 a.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/st-louis-braces-for-protestsas-officer-found-not-guilty-of-2011-killing-of-black-man-1505493669.
92 Missouri v. Stockley, No. 1622-CR02213-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2017).
93 Melissa Matthews, Jason Stockley Verdict: How Bias May Have
Influenced Judge Wilson’s Ruling, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:21
p.m.), http://www.newsweek.com/judge-wilson-implicit-bias-acquittal666231.
94 Id.
95 Jennifer L. Howell & Kate A. Ratliff, Not Your Average Bigot: The
Better-Than-Average Effect and Defensive Responding to Implicit
Association Test Feedback, 56 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 127 (2017).
96 Margo J. Monteith, Corrine I. Voils & Leslie Ashburn-Nardo,
Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, Interpreting, and Reacting to
Implicit Racial Biases, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 395, 407–08 (2001).
97 Id. (detailing examples, such as, “White is usually associated with
goodness and black with badness,” and “the White names were paired
with pleasant things first, that set the ‘pattern’”).
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larger the discrepancy between an individual’s selfperceived and demonstrated biases, the more likely that
individual was to externalize their results and blame
factors unrelated to race.98 As a result, individuals with
the highest levels of bias were the least likely to feel
guilty or motivated to address their biases.99 A second
study demonstrated that individuals with a stronger race
preference on the IAT ultimately expressed more negative
attitudes toward the test.100 And a third study, which ties
directly back to egocentric bias, demonstrated that
individuals who believed themselves to be “better than
average” in terms of avoiding biases were most
susceptible to responding defensively when IAT results
showed otherwise.101
Such defensiveness is likely tied to societal stigma
surrounding implicit bias. IAT results “may produce
unexpected and undesired feedback” that ultimately could
prompt an increase in “avoidance of that feedback.”102 As
a result, individuals who receive undesirable IAT
feedback “may dismiss or derogate it or deny it
altogether,”103 likely in an effort to downplay what they
perceive to be a character flaw as opposed to an innate
tendency.
So what measures can be taken to lessen the
stigma? Chief Justice Mark Cady of the Iowa Supreme
Court recently addressed this issue, noting, “Implicit bias
is not racism or bigotry and must not be viewed as such.
It involves a human condition and forces separate from
racism and will perpetuate injustice and inequity until it
can be meaningfully addressed.”104 His words stress the
Id. at 411.
Id.
100 Amy L. Hilliard, Carey S. Ryan & Sarah J. Gervais, Reactions to
the Implicit Association Test as an Educational Tool: A Mixed
Methods Study, 16 SOC. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 495, 512 (2013).
101 Howell & Ratliff, supra note 82, at 138.
102 Jennifer L. Howell, Brian Collisson, Laura Crysel, Carlos O.
Garrido, Steve M. Newell, Catherine A. Cottrell, Colin Tucker Smith
& James A. Shepperd, Managing the Threat of Impending Implicit
Attitude Feedback, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 714, 719
(2003).
103 Id. (citations omitted).
104 Mark S. Cady, A Justice System’s Response to Implicit Bias,
presented at the Iowa Defense Counsel Association Annual
Convention (June 2017),
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importance of removing the stigma of racism from implicit
bias; only then will judges feel fully vindicated and begin
acknowledging the extent of the problem. As Judge
Bennett and Professor Richardson noted earlier,
identifying manifestations of implicit bias as a problem
needing redress is the first step toward that redress.
V. NORMALIZATION & UPDATING THE MODEL CODE
All proposed solutions mentioned above require
judges to take conscious action at the outset of hearing
cases and rendering decisions. As previously discussed,
the potential for defensiveness may inhibit the benefits of
these solutions. Instead, I propose a solution that begins
to combat implicit biases by first addressing the stigma
that continues to inhibit meaningful discussions of the
problem. Once the stigma surrounding implicit biases is
eliminated, the existing proposals can fully realize their
potential in combating the effects of implicit bias.
A. Defining Normalization
Normalization is the process by which society
begins to perceive a given behavior or trait as “normal.” In
other words, it involves a “redefinition of modern
discourse to allow extreme views to be considered
normal.”105 Like implicit bias, normalization is a
subconscious process that can have a powerful, but
completely hidden, influence on an individual’s actions
and beliefs.106 It is ultimately “the process through which
wisdom becomes conventional and utopian ideals slam
against questions of feasibility.”107
https://www.iowadefensecounsel.org/IDCAPdfs/Presentations/2017/Ju
sticeCady.pdf.
105 Emily Dreyfuss, The Normalization of ‘Normalize’ is a Sign of the
New Normal, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:59 p.m.),
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/normalization-normalize-sign-newnormal/.
106 Jessica Brown, The Powerful Way That Normalisation Shapes Our
World, BBC (Mar. 20, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170314-how-do-we-determinewhen-a-behaviour-is-normal.
107 Hua Hsu, What Normalization Means, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 13,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/whatnormalization-means.
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Normalization can be dangerous—if one routinely
experiences violence, for example, it can become a “new
normal” that demotivates the individual from finding a
way out. But normalization can also be used as a tool for
change. Groups have made conscious (and successful)
attempts to manipulate the norm in an effort to change
attitudes. For example, extended efforts have been made
to normalize recycling108 and mental illness.109
In the case of recycling, normalization initiatives
stemmed from a desire to see certain behaviors
increase.110 But in the case of mental illness, the push for
normalization stemmed from a desire to eradicate a
stigma.111 A stigma “refer[s] to an attribute that is deeply
discrediting” or a “special kind of relationship between
attribute and stereotype.”112 One specific type of stigma
involves “blemishes of individual character perceived as
weak will, domineering or unnatural passions,
treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty.”113
Like mental illness, the concept of implicit bias is
plagued with stigma. The current norm still involves an
expectation for unbiased behavior; this expectation is
especially heightened for judges. So, if a judge were
inclined to openly confront his or her own implicit white
preference, for example, this egalitarian motive could
easily be overshadowed by a stigma assigned for bias. As
discussed, such a stigma has strong—if not fatal—
consequences in the judiciary.
But by striving to make the concept of implicit bias
“normal,” judges would become free to engage against it
rather than denying its existence altogether for selfSee Ruth Rettie, Chris Barnham & Kevin Burchell, Social
Normalisation and Consumer Behaviour: Using Marketing to Make
Green Normal 2 (Kingston Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 8, 2011).
109 See, e.g., Mary Walker Baron, Calling in Crazy: Why We Must
Normalize Mental Illness, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2012, 5:49
p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-walker-baron/mentalillness-stigma_b_1301514.html.
110 Brown, supra note 106.
111 See B.A. Pescoslido, J.K. Martin, J.S. Long, T.R. Medina, J.C.
Phelan & B.G. Link, “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of Change
in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol
Dependence, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1321–22 (2010).
112 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 3–4 (1963).
113 Id. at 4.
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preservation. No longer would the previously proposed
proposals face backlash. But how does one initiate
normalization?
B. Revisiting the Model Code
Recall that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to operate “without bias.”114 Given the
inherent nature of implicit biases, operating fully without
bias is not entirely possible. After all, Americans, on
average, demonstrate a strong white preference,115 and
evidence demonstrates that judges are no different.116
To begin the process of normalizing implicit bias in
the judiciary, I propose an addition to the comments
under Model Rule 2.3. While the Rule itself should
continue to require judges to “perform the duties of
judicial office . . . without bias,”117 a comment appended to
the Rule should reflect the unilateral existence of implicit
biases and the need for judges to endeavor to combat
them. First, such a change would signal to judges the
ubiquity of implicit biases, which begins to normalize the
concept at no one individual’s expense. Additionally,
absent such a comment, one might interpret the Rule as
providing that a confrontation of one’s own implicit biases
could result in discipline, as such confrontation would
acknowledge the existence of bias in the first place.
Finally, this comment would place a burden on judges to
confront their implicit biases; this affirmative duty does
not yet exist, potentially to the detriment of countless
parties whose outcomes are affected by manifestations of
judges’ implicit biases.
While this comment would not be widely
actionable—it would be very difficult to prove that a judge
actively avoided either learning of his or her own implicit
biases or attempting to combat them—its import lies in
its symbolism. Creating an environment in which judges
are exposed to the concept of implicit bias (and the
faultlessness of unknowingly harboring them) has the
potential to reduce collective defensiveness. As implied by
the studies discussed earlier, reduction in the stigma or
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1199.
116 Id. at 1221.
117 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
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“blame” surrounding implicit bias would only accelerate
efforts to eradicate it.
C. An Important Note
A proposal to normalize implicit biases may be
criticized for catering to white privilege, as it is centered
around an effort to make implicitly-biased individuals—
by the numbers, namely whites—feel comfortable in
addressing racial issues and thus “trivializ[ing] [whites’]
history of brutality towards people of color and perverts
the reality of that history.”118 Creating a comment in the
Code of Judicial Conduct aimed at normalizing implicit
bias may allow whites to “protect their moral character
against what they perceive as accusation and attack while
deflecting any recognition of culpability or need of
accountability.”119
This perspective should not be understated. While
this proposal does minimize the personal culpability
behind the development of implicit biases, it does so with
two important underpinnings. First, this proposal has the
same ultimate goal as that expressed by DiAngelo: that
“[a]ll white people build the stamina to sustain conscious
and explicit engagement with race,”120 so that all forms of
bias can ultimately be eradicated. Second, this proposal is
truly aimed at implicit biases; it should not be read to
absolve any explicit biases. Those who harbor implicit
biases, by definition, do not know at the outset that they
exist, and this proposal sets the groundwork for an
environment conducive to their confrontation. The
proposed comment would compel judges to unilaterally
define and confront their own biases, and it would remove
plausible deniability as an option for those who may have
wished to remain willfully blind. While solutions that
better confront white privilege must be explored, the
proposed comment can be seen as a crucial first step.

Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54,
61 (2011).
119 Id. at 64.
120 Id. at 66.
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CONCLUSION
Judge Jerome Frank, sitting on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, once opined,
“If . . . ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The
human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of
paper.”121 It must become normal to accept that judges—
like all humans and, indeed, vertebrates—harbor implicit
biases; acceptance of these biases at the outset is the
necessary first step in order to fully eradicate them.

Oakes & Davies, supra note 8, at 580 (quoting In re JP Linahan
Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943)).
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